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Abstract 
There is growing evidence that face-to-face interaction is declining in many countries, 
exacerbating the phenomenon of social isolation. On the other hand, social interaction 
through online networking sites is steeply rising. To analyze these societal dynamics, 
we have built an evolutionary game model in which agents can choose between three 
strategies of social participation: 1) interaction via both online social networks and 
face-to-face encounters; 2) interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters; 3) 
opting out from both forms of participation in pursuit of social isolation. We illustrate 
the dynamics of interaction among these three types of agent that the model predicts, in 
light of the empirical evidence provided by previous literature. We then assess their 
welfare implications. We show that when online interaction is less gratifying than 
offline encounters, the dynamics of agents’ rational choices of interaction will lead to 
the extinction of the sub-population of online networks users, thereby making Facebook 
and similar platforms disappear in the long run. Furthermore, we show that the higher 
the propensity for discrimination of those who interact via online social networks and 
via face-to-face encounters (i.e., their preference for the interaction with agents of their 
same type), the greater the probability will be that they all will end up choosing social 
isolation in the long run, making society fall into a “social poverty trap”. 
JEL codes: C73, D85, O33, Z13 
Keywords: Social networks; segregation; dynamics of social interaction; social media, 
social networking sites.  
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1. Introduction 
Social interactions affect a variety of behaviors and economic outcomes, including the formation of 
opinions and tastes, investment in human capital, access to jobs and credit, social mobility, 
subjective well-being and the emergence of collective action, to name a few. While face-to-face 
interactions have reportedly been declining in many countries over the last two decades (Putnam, 
2000; Cox, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Li et al., 2003; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015), 
participation in social networking sites (SNS), such as Facebook and Twitter, has steeply risen 
(Duggan et al., 2015).3 The advent of online social networks has radically changed the way we 
interact with others and this change can have major economic and welfare consequences. 
In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) suggested that technology-based private entertainment, such as 
television, could replace face-to-face meetings and civic engagement in individual preferences. This 
claim was supported in virtually any empirical test on the role of television, which was found to 
displace encounters with friends, associational activities and political participation (e.g., Bruni and 
Stanca, 2008). Following Putnam’s argument about television, early Internet studies advanced the 
“crowding-out hypothesis”, according to which Internet use crowds-out social engagement. As 
television, a unidirectional mass medium, displaced so many activities, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the Internet, which allows for interactive communication, might induce an even more powerful 
substitution effect (DiMaggio et al., 2001). The first empirical studies on the relationship between 
Internet use and face-to-face interactions supported the crowding-out hypothesis (Kraut et al., 1998; 
Nie et al., 2002). Subsequent studies, on the other hand, found conflicting results, suggesting that 
the effect of Internet use may vary with users’ preferences and personal characteristics (see, e.g., 
Gershuny, 2003). Yet, these studies are not conclusive; at that time, in fact, using the Internet was 
predominantly a solitary activity that was connected with private entertainment. The advent of 
online social networks radically transformed the way that people use the Internet, which largely 
extended the possibilities to interact with others. 
Despite the extent of the transformations brought about by online networking, existing research on 
the relationship between face-to-face interaction and SNS-mediated interaction is limited. There are 
empirical studies on the effect of broadband access on outcomes such as social participation and 
voting behavior (e.g., Bauernschuster et al., 2014; Falck et al., 2014). A few authors specifically 
addressed the role of SNS in some aspects of social capital, such as face-to-face interaction and 
trust (Sabatini and Sarracino, 2017). These works put the crowding-out hypothesis into perspective, 
suggesting that face-to-face and Internet-mediated interaction may rather be complementary. 
Additionally, while early sociological studies implicitly suggested that there is a risk of segregation 																																																								
3 Hereafter, online social networks, social networking sites (or SNS) and online networking will be used as synonyms 
for the sake of brevity. For a discussion about definitions, see Ellison and Boyd (2013). 
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of the two populations of Internet users and socially active individuals, more recent works illustrate 
the emergence of two main types of social actors: those who only interact with others face-to-face 
and those who develop their social life both online and through face-to-face interactions (e.g., 
Helliwell and Huang, 2013; Sabatini and Sarracino, 2014).  
In addition, a third population of socially isolated individuals who devote an increasing share of 
their time to work and private consumption seems to be growing in richer and emerging countries 
(see, e.g., Putnam, 2000; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). Antoci et al. (2012) showed how the 
choice of social isolation might be a rational response, allowing individuals to adapt to the 
relational poverty of the surrounding environment and to the reduction in leisure time. 
To date, however, we lack a theoretical framework to study how social interaction via SNS relates 
to interaction via physical encounters and to the intentional withdrawal from social participation 
that was feared by Putnam (2000) in Bowling Alone. 
We add to the previous literature by developing an evolutionary game model of SNS-mediated 
interaction. In our simplified framework, agents can choose among three possible strategies of 
social interaction. Individuals who want to be socially active can adopt two alternative strategies: 1) 
to interact by means of both SNS and face-to-face encounters or 2) not to use SNS and only develop 
social relationships by means of face-to-face encounters. The distinctive trait of these two strategies 
is the use of SNS.4 Alternatively, agents can opt out from both types of interaction and renounce 
social participation. This strategy of social isolation may be viewed as a drastic form of adaptation 
to the conditions of social decay, increasing busyness and declining opportunities for social 
engagement, a strategy that provides constant payoffs that are independent of the behaviors of 
others.  
The analysis shows that, depending on the configuration of payoffs and the initial distribution of the 
three strategies in the population, different Nash equilibria can be reached. In particular, we found 
that the stationary state in which all individuals choose isolation is always locally attractive. Thus, it 
represents a social poverty trap, i.e., an equilibrium, in which no one has an interest in interacting 
with others and everybody devotes all of their available time to work or to private consumption.  
Only the stationary states in which all individuals play the same strategy can be attractive Nash 
equilibria. The dynamics leading to such states are self-feeding, to the extent to which agents get a 
higher payoff when they interact with agents adopting their same strategy. When the three 																																																								
4 We do not use other tools for online communication, such as emails and voice systems (e.g., Skype), in defining the 
possible strategies of social participation. This is because such tools are commonly spread across the sub-population of 
socially active individuals, independently of their use of online social networks. Descriptive statistics from various 
institutions report that virtually the entire population of online adults uses non-SNS-mediated tools of online 
communication. Distinguishing them from other types of online socially active individuals would make no sense. This 
aspect will be further explained in Section 2.1. 
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stationary states are simultaneously attractive, the social poverty trap is always Pareto dominated by 
the other equilibria and, therefore, it can be considered as the worst-case scenario. 
Depending on the parameters, the stationary state in which all individuals socially participate 
through SNS may be the second-best scenario, which is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium in 
which everyone interacts exclusively by means of physical encounters. Social interaction via SNS, 
in fact, may be interpreted as a coping response that allows individuals to “defend” their social life 
from increasing busyness and the reduction in leisure time. In this case, the widening of the agents’ 
opportunity set for social interactions can prevent the achievement of the first best scenario. At the 
same time, however, it allows society to avoid the worst-case scenario of the attractive social 
poverty trap. In all cases, the achievement of a specific equilibrium depends on the initial 
distribution of the three ways of social interaction in the population.  
The propensity for discrimination of socially active individuals (i.e., the agents’ preference for 
interacting with people adopting their same strategy) defines the structure of the basin of attraction 
of the social poverty trap.5 The higher the propensity for discrimination, in fact, the greater the 
probability that both kinds of agents will end up segregating themselves from the rest of the 
population, making society fall into the trap.  
Our contribution is related to three strands of the literature. The first includes empirical studies that 
documented a decline in face-to-face social participation in many countries (e.g., Putnam, 2000; 
Costa and Kahn, 2003; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). We add to this literature by providing a 
theoretical framework that helps us to understand the roots of the decline in participation. 
The second strand is that of economists who theoretically and empirically analyzed how the Internet 
use may affect social capital (Falck et al., 2014; Bauernschuster et al., 2014; Antoci et al., 2012; 
2015; Sabatini and Sarracino, 2015; Castellacci and Schwabe, 2017). Antoci et al. (2012) modelled 
the choice between two means of social participation, based on Internet-mediated and face-to-face 
interaction, in a framework where the time available for social participation is exogenously given. 
Antoci et al. (2015) added to previous work by including the choice to withdraw entirely from 
social participation. The evolutionary framework that is presented in this paper contributes to this 
body of research in several ways. First, we introduce a new specification of the social interaction 
mechanism (Section 2.1) that determines the probability of meeting between individuals belonging 
to each of the three sub-populations considered. Second, the resulting configuration of payoffs 
(Section 2.2)—which allows the outcomes of interaction to vary according to the type of agent with 
which people are matched—takes into account the propensity for discrimination, allowing us to 
study its dynamic outcomes in terms of segregation. 																																																								
5 The classification of dynamic regimes is illustrated in section five. 
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This latter aspect links our work to a third literature that refers to theoretical studies on social 
interaction and segregation. Schelling’s (1969; 1971) seminal contribution explained how people’s 
preferences for interaction with similar others—and, therefore, for discrimination against different 
others—generates dynamics that naturally lead to segregation. Bischi and Merlone (2011) 
developed Shelling’s work by formalizing a two-dimensional dynamic system to study segregation. 
The authors showed how adaptive rules shape evolutive paths that lead to the emergence of 
different collective behaviors in the long run. When members of a population are characterized by a 
limited tolerance of diversity, the complete separation of different populations may occur. Radi et al. 
(2014a; 2014b) further developed this framework by analyzing the role of regulating institutions 
constraining the number of individuals of a population that are allowed to enter and exit the system.  
Our work adds to this literature by illustrating how the configuration of payoffs drives population 
dynamics towards segregation. If we allow for a configuration of payoffs that reflects a preference 
for interaction with similar others, then dynamics will lead to the complete separation of the three 
populations accounted for in our framework. This is consistent with Bischi and Merlone (2011). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we describe the model and analyze the 
evolutionary dynamics. Sections four and five present the basic results and the classification of 
dynamic regimes. Section six discusses the possible dynamics predicted by the model for a specific 
distribution of the different forms of participation suggested by the existing empirical literature. 
Section seven concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
2.1 The Social Interaction Mechanism 
We consider an economy made up of identical individuals. In each instant of time t, each individual 
has to choose one of the pure strategies of social interaction mentioned in the introduction of this 
paper: 
1) Interaction via online social networks and face-to-face. We call this strategy SN (because its 
distinctive trait is the use of social networks). The SN strategy entails different degrees of SNS-
mediated interaction according to individual preferences. In general, we think of SN agents as 
individuals who develop social ties via SNS at their convenience—for example, by using Facebook 
to stay in touch with friends and acquaintances or to establish contacts with unknown others—and 
meet their contacts in person whenever they want to or have time.  
2) Interaction by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We call this strategy NS (because its 
players make no use of social networks). The empirical evidence shows that, despite the steep rise 
in the use of SNS, a remarkable number of online adults choose not to use them. 
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The distinctive trait of the two strategies is the use of SNS for social interaction, which has two 
features: it allows asynchronous and complex interactions and it generates club effects that may 
favor segregation to the extent to which users receive different payoffs when dealing with other 
users or with non-users. 
3) Social isolation. This is a strategy in which agents prefer to devote all of their time to work and 
to forms of private consumption that do not entail any significant relationships, either online or 
face-to-face (Antoci et al., 2015). We call this strategy NP (for no participation). NP players tend to 
replace relational goods (e.g., playing in a chess tournament with friends) with material goods (e.g., 
software for playing chess with a computer). We assume that NP agents do not retire from work and 
that their social relations are limited to on-the-job interactions.  
The withdrawal from social interactions modelled with the NP strategy may be viewed as a drastic 
form of adaptation to the conditions of social decay that make NP players’ payoffs constant and 
completely independent of the behavior of others. The notion of defensive choices is not new in the 
literature. Hirsch (1976) was the first to introduce the concept of defensive consumption induced by 
the negative externalities of growth. This kind of consumption may occur in response to a change in 
the physical or social environment: “If the environment deteriorates, for example, through dirtier air 
or more crowded roads, then a shift in resources to counter these ‘bads’ does not represent a change 
in consumer tastes but a response, on the basis of existing tastes, to a reduction in net welfare” 
(Hirsch, 1976, p. 63). Antoci et al. (2007) generalized the study of defensive consumption choices 
to the case of a deteriorating social environment. If the social environment deteriorates, for example, 
in relation to a shift in prevailing social values or to a decline in the opportunities for social 
engagement, then individuals might want to replace the production and consumption of relational 
goods with the production and consumption of private goods.6 The authors suggested that the 
reduction in the time available for social participation could trigger self-feeding processes, leading 
to the progressive erosion of the stock of social capital. 
We assume that the sizes of the three sub-populations of individuals playing strategies SN, NS and 
NP at time t are expressed by the real variables 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡), respectively. The size of the total 
population is normalized to 1, so that 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! ≥ 0 and 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! = 1 hold. We establish that 
individuals enjoying their leisure time—which coincides, by assumption, with their social 
participation time—are in L mode. By contrast, those who are currently working or engaged in 
private activities that have no effect on the payoffs of others are in W mode. All individuals 
choosing the NP strategy are always in W mode. 																																																								
6 A peculiarity of relational goods is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production from consumption, since 
they coincide (Gui and Sugden, 2005). 
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The social interaction mechanism, which determines the payoffs of each strategy, is described by 
the following assumptions. In each instant of time t: 
a) An individual choosing either the SN or the NS strategy has an l probability of being in L mode 
and a 1- l probability of being in W mode. 
b) An L mode individual adopting the SN strategy has an n probability of interacting online with 
individuals of the same type and a 1-n probability of interacting face-to-face with individuals of the 
same type and with L mode individuals playing the NS strategy. The values of l and n are assumed 
to be exogenously determined (i.e., l and n are parameters of the model). 
Therefore, in each instant of time t: 
1) A share l ∈ (0,1) of the sub-populations 𝑥! and 𝑥! is in L mode. The remaining share, 1- l, is in W 
mode. 
2) A share n ∈ (0,1) of the sub-population of size 𝑙𝑥! interacts online via a SNS with individuals of 
the same type, while a share 1-n of such a sub-population interacts via face-to-face encounters both 
with individuals of the same type and with individuals belonging to the sub-population of size 𝑙𝑥!. 
3) On the other hand, L mode individuals playing the NS strategy interact with L mode individuals 
playing the same strategy and with the share 1-n of L mode individuals playing the SN strategy and 
currently interacting via face-to-face encounters.  
 
2.2 Payoffs 
According to this game framework: 
a) 𝑙𝑛 is the conditional probability, for an individual playing SN, of being (at the instant of time t) 
an L mode individual (this happens with probability l) interacting online via a SNS (this happens 
with probability n); 𝑙𝑛𝑥! thus represents the expected size of the sub-population of individuals of 
this type. 
b) 𝑙 1− 𝑛  is the conditional probability, for an individual playing SN, of being an L mode 
individual playing the SN strategy and interacting via face-to-face encounters; therefore, 𝑙 1− 𝑛 𝑥! 
is the expected size of the sub-population of individuals of this type. 
c) 𝑙  is the probability, for an individual playing NS, of being an L mode individual (and, 
consequently, interacting via face-to-face encounters); therefore, 𝑙𝑥!  is the expected size of the sub-
population of individuals of this type. 
We assume that every W mode individual obtains the payoff α, where α is a strictly positive 
parameter, independently of the strategy he adopts, and from the distribution 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! of the 
strategies in the population. Furthermore, we assume that every L mode individual obtains a payoff 
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equal to 0 when interacting with a W mode individual, while he obtains the payoffs expressed in the 
following table when interacting with another L mode individual: 
 
 
 
 The parameter 𝛽 measures the payoff of an L mode individual adopting the SN strategy when 
interacting online with another individual of the same type. The parameters 𝛾 and δ measure the 
payoffs of an L mode individual adopting the SN strategy when interacting face-to-face with another 
individual of the same type and with an L mode individual adopting the NS strategy, respectively. 
Analogously, 𝜂 and ε are the parameters measuring the payoffs of an L mode individual adopting 
the NS strategy due to the face-to-face interaction with an individual of the same type and an 
individual adopting the SN strategy, respectively. 
 
The expected payoffs of strategies SN and NS are given respectively by: 
 𝐸𝑃!"(𝑥!, 𝑥!) = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝑙𝑛 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑥! + 𝑙 1− 𝑛 𝛾𝑙 1− 𝑛 𝑥! + 𝛿𝑙𝑥! = = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙!𝑛!𝑥! + 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 !𝑥! + 𝛿𝑙!(1− 𝑛)𝑥! 
 
 
 𝐸𝑃!"(𝑥!, 𝑥!) = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝑙 𝜀𝑙 1− 𝑛 𝑥! + 𝜂𝑙𝑥! = = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑙! 1− 𝑛 𝑥! + 𝜂𝑙!𝑥! 
 
while the expected payoff of an individual adopting the NP strategy is given by: 
 𝐸𝑃!" = 𝛼 > 0 
 
Table	1:	Payoffs	of	L-mode	individuals 
 SN player interacting 
online 
SN player interacting 
face to face 
NS player 
SN player interacting 
online 
β  0 0 
SN player interacting 
face to face 
0 γ δ 
NS player 0 ε η 
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The payoffs highlight some points about discrimination. First, a clear separation occurs between 
those who choose to withdraw from social interaction and all the other players. In a sense, NP 
players choose to segregate themselves from the rest of the population. Second, when SN players 
spend their leisure time interacting via SNS, they de facto segregate themselves from the two 
populations of NS and NP players, who do not use online social networks.  
The sub-populations of individuals playing the SN and NS strategies can only meet in the context of 
face-to-face interactions. The two extreme cases δ≤0 and ε≤ 0 entail discrimination. In these cases, 
in fact, when individuals adopting different strategies of participation meet face-to-face, they get a 
null or a negative reward. As a result, they will prefer to interact with individuals of their same type. 
For example, SN players may want to check what happens in their online networks while having 
dinner with friends. NS players, who are not familiar with SNS, may, in turn, feel uncomfortable 
sitting at a table where everyone is checking a smartphone instead of talking to each other. If this is 
the case, the benefits ε of the dinner for NS players may be null or negative. At the same time, the 
impossibility of checking Facebook during face-to-face interactions—due, for example, to the 
moral obligation to talk—can make SN players feel uncomfortable and anxious (e.g., Shu-Chun et 
al., 2012). In this case, the benefits δ of the dinner may be poor or even null or negative for SN 
players, too. As a result, SN and NS players might want to discriminate in face-to-face interactions. 
More generally, players’ preferences for their similar type may be interpreted as a matter of 
homophily. Empirical literature has shown that informal segregation spontaneously emerges in 
relation to discrimination on the grounds of specific individual characteristics and/or as a result of 
peer pressure (McPherson et al., 2001). SNS studies have shown that online social networks are so 
pervasive that they may well be considered as a crucial individual characteristic that prompts a 
negative bias towards non-users, and vice versa.7 
On the other hand, SN players may receive different payoffs when interacting with others of the 
same type, depending on whether the interaction takes place online or offline. Several experiments, 
in fact, have shown that people behave online in a very peculiar way as compared to face-to-face 
interaction. Kiesler et al. (1984) observed that computer-mediated communication entails 
anonymity, reduced self-regulation and reduced self-awareness. ‘The overall weakening of self- or 
normative regulation might be similar to what happens when people become less self-aware and 
submerged in a group, that is, deindividuated (p. 1126). Deindividuation has, in turn, been found to 
be conducive to disinhibition and lack of restraint (Diener, 1979). Siegel et al. (1983) found that 																																																								
7 For example, according to the Social Recruiting Survey conducted by Jobvite (2014), 92% of recruiters use social 
media for evaluating candidates. Furthermore, 94% use LinkedIn, 66% use Facebook and 52% use Twitter. Those who 
refer to Facebook mostly use the platform to assess candidates’ “cultural fit”. People without Facebook pages, in 
particular, are viewed as “suspicious” by hiring managers. 
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people in computer-mediated groups were more aggressive than they were in face-to-face groups, 
as measured by uninhibited verbal behavior. Deregulation and disinhibition encourage “online 
incivility”, which includes aggressive or disrespectful behaviors, vile comments, online harassment, 
and hate speech.  
Antoci et al. (2016) argued that online incivility may be a major cause of frustration and 
dissatisfaction, which suggests that the benefits of the interaction between SN players could also be 
negative (𝛽 < 0) if the interaction takes place via SNS, and positive (𝛾 > 0) if the interaction 
occurs face-to-face. 
 
3.2 Evolutionary Dynamics 
We assume that the adoption process of strategies SN, NS and NP is determined by the well-known 
replicator equations in continuous time (see, e.g., Weibull 1995): 
     𝑥! = 𝑥! 𝐸𝑃!" − 𝐸𝑃    𝑥! = 𝑥! 𝐸𝑃!" − 𝐸𝑃      (1)  𝑥! = 𝑥! 𝐸𝑃!" − 𝐸𝑃  
 
where   𝑥! ,  𝑥! , and 𝑥!  represent the time derivatives of the functions 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡), and 𝑥!(𝑡), 
respectively, and 
 𝐸𝑃 = 𝑥!𝐸𝑃!" + 𝑥!𝐸𝑃!" + 𝑥!𝐸𝑃!" 
 
is the population-wide average payoff of strategies.  
Dynamics (1) are defined in the simplex S illustrated in Figure 1, where 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! ≥ 0 and 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! = 1  hold. The vertices of S, i.e., the vectors 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) , 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) , and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) , correspond to the states in which all individuals adopt a unique strategy—
respectively, SN, NS or NP.  
We denote 𝑒! − 𝑒! the edge of S joining 𝑒!  with 𝑒!; thus 𝑒! − 𝑒! is the edge where only strategies SN 
and NS are present in the population (see Figure 1), 𝑒! − 𝑒! is the edge where only strategies SN 
and NP are present, and 𝑒! − 𝑒! is the edge where only strategies NS and NP are present. As usual 
with replicator dynamics, such edges are invariant sets. 
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Figure 1. The simplex S, where 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! ≥ 0 and 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! = 1 hold. The vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0), 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0), and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) correspond to the states in which all individuals adopt the unique 
strategy SN, NS or NP, respectively. 
 
 
It is easy to check that dynamics (1) can be written in the following form (see, e.g., Bomze 1983): 
 𝑥! = 𝑥! 𝑒! ∙ 𝐴𝒙− 𝒙 ∙ 𝐴𝒙 ,   𝑖 = 1, 2, 3     (2) 
 
where 𝒙 is the vector 𝒙 = (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!), and A is the payoff matrix: 
 
𝐴 = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙!𝑛! + 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 ! 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑙!(1− 𝑛) 1− 𝑙 𝛼1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑙! 1− 𝑛 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝜂𝑙! 1− 𝑙 𝛼𝛼 𝛼 𝛼   (3) 
 
We will analyze dynamics (2) under the following assumptions: 
 
Assumption I 𝐸𝑃!" 1,0 > 𝐸𝑃!"(1,0), i.e., 𝛽𝑛! + 𝛾 1− 𝑛 ! > 𝜀 1− 𝑛 : the SN strategy is better performing 
than the NS strategy in a social context in which all individuals adopt the SN strategy (i.e., 𝑥! = 1, 𝑥! = 0). 
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Assumption II 𝐸𝑃!" 0,1 > 𝐸𝑃!"(0,1), i.e., 𝜂 > 𝛿(1− 𝑛): the NS strategy is better performing than the SN 
strategy in a social context in which all individuals adopt the NS strategy (i.e., 𝑥! = 0, 𝑥! = 1). 
 
Assumption I establishes a minimal condition for segregation. This condition is always satisfied if β 
and γ, i.e., the benefits that SN players get when they interact online and face-to-face with other SN 
players, respectively, are positive and ε, i.e., the reward that NS players get when interacting with 
SN players face-to-face, is negative or equal to zero. In this case, SN players will discriminate 
against those who do not use online social networks, and NS players will not have any specific 
interest in engaging with them. More generally, Assumption I is satisfied if the value of ε is 
sufficiently lower than β and γ, i.e., 𝜀 < 𝛽𝑛!/ 1− 𝑛 + 𝛾 1− 𝑛 . 
Assumption II requires that the benefit δ obtained by SN players that meet NS individuals face-to-
face is sufficiently lower than the benefit obtained by NS players when they meet face-to-face with 
individuals of their same type. This condition is certainly satisfied if η ≥ δ. In this case, NS players 
discriminate, in face-to-face encounters, against those who adopt the SN strategy.  
 
4. Results 
It is well-known that dynamics (2) do not change if an arbitrary constant is added to all entries of a 
column of A (see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; p. 126). Therefore, we can replace matrix A in 
equations (2) with the following normalized matrix B, with the first row made of zeros: 
 
𝐵 = 0 0 0𝑎 𝑏 𝑐𝑑 𝑒 𝑓 = 
= 0 0 0𝜀𝑙! 1− 𝑛 − 𝛽𝑙!𝑛! − 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 ! 𝜂𝑙! − 𝛿𝑙!(1− 𝑛) 0𝛼𝑙 − 𝛽𝑙!𝑛! − 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 ! 𝛼𝑙 − 𝛿𝑙!(1− 𝑛) 𝑙𝛼   (4) 
 
According to Assumptions I and II, 𝑎 < 0  and 𝑏 > 0  hold. Furthermore, 𝑓 > 0  always. The 
dynamic regimes that can be observed under Assumptions I and II can be classified taking into 
account the following results. 
 
Proposition 1 
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1) The stationary state 𝑒! is a sink (i.e., it is locally attractive) if the following condition holds (see 
matrix (4)): 
 𝑑 = 𝛼𝑙 − 𝛽𝑙!𝑛! − 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 !< 0 i.e.,  𝛼 < 𝛽𝑙𝑛! + 𝛾𝑙 1− 𝑛 !   (5) 
 
but it is a saddle point if (5) does not hold (In such a case, the stable manifold lies in the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!, while the unstable manifold belongs to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!.) 
2) The stationary state 𝑒! is a sink if the following condition holds (see matrix (4)): 
 𝑒 − 𝑏 = 𝛼𝑙 − 𝜂𝑙!<0i.e.,  𝛼 < 𝜂𝑙     (6) 
 
but it is a saddle point if (6) does not hold (In such a case, the stable manifold lies in the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!, while the unstable manifold belongs to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!.) 
3) The stationary state 𝑒!  is always a sink. 
 
Proof: See the Mathematical Appendix A. 
Note that conditions (5) and (6) are simultaneously satisfied if the value of the parameter 𝛼 
measuring the (constant) payoff of the NP strategy is low enough. Distinct from 𝑒! and 𝑒!, the 
stationary state 𝑒! is always a sink, whatever the value of the parameter 𝛼 > 0 is. 
When the pure population states 𝑒!, 𝑒!, and 𝑒! are sinks, they also are Nash equilibria (see, e.g., 
Weibull, 1995). In such a case, they can be interpreted as stable social conventions representing 
self-enforcing configurations of the social environment.  
In our model, individuals’ welfare evaluated at 𝑒!, 𝑒!, and 𝑒! is measured, respectively, by: 
 
   𝐸𝑃!" 1,0 = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙!𝑛! + 𝛾𝑙! 1− 𝑛 ! 
   𝐸𝑃!" 0,1 = 1− 𝑙 𝛼 + 𝜂𝑙! 
   𝐸𝑃!" = 𝛼 
 
The following proposition deals with Pareto dominance relationships among the stationary states 𝑒!, 𝑒!, and 𝑒!. 
 
Proposition 2 
The stationary state 𝑒! Pareto dominates the stationary state 𝑒!  (i.e., 𝐸𝑃!" 1,0 > 𝐸𝑃!" 0,1 ) if: 
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𝜂 < 𝛽𝑛! + 𝛾 1− 𝑛 !     (7) 
 
and Pareto dominates the stationary state 𝑒!  (i.e., 𝐸𝑃!" 1,0 > 𝐸𝑃!") if: 
 𝛼 < 𝛽𝑙𝑛! + 𝛾𝑙 1− 𝑛 !     (8) 
 
The stationary state 𝑒! Pareto dominates the stationary state (i.e., 𝐸𝑃!" 1,0 > 𝐸𝑃!") if: 
 𝛼 < 𝜂𝑙       (9) 
 
Proof: Straightforward. 
 
It is important to note that (8) and (9) coincide, respectively, with the stability conditions (5) and (6). 
Therefore, if and only if 𝑒! and 𝑒! are sinks, they Pareto dominate the stationary state 𝑒! in which 
individuals withdraw from social participation. This implies that, in the context in which at least 
one of the stationary states 𝑒! and 𝑒! are sinks, the stationary state 𝑒! (which is always locally 
attractive) can be interpreted as a social poverty trap. In the trap, everyone withdraws from social 
participation and devote all of their available time to “private” activities, including work and 
consumption that does not entail any significant social relationship. The “social poverty” that 
derives from this situation—manifesting, for example, in the scarcity of participation opportunities 
and in the strengthening of materialistic values—makes social interaction difficult and unrewarding.  
Also note that the Pareto dominance relationship between 𝑒! and 𝑒! (see (7)) does not depend on 
the stability conditions (5) and (6), and, consequently, 𝑒! may Pareto dominate 𝑒! or vice versa, 
independently of their stability properties.  
The following proposition concerns the existence and stability properties of the other possible 
stationary states of dynamics (2), i.e., the stationary states in which at least two among the available 
strategies, are adopted by (strictly) positive shares of the population.  
 
Proposition 3 
1) A unique stationary state in the interior of S (i.e., with 𝑥! > 0 all 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3), in which all 
strategies are played, exists if: 
 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 = 𝑙! 𝜀 1− 𝑛 𝛼 − 𝛿𝑙(1− 𝑛) +  𝛼𝛿 1− 𝑛 + 
    +𝑙! (𝜂𝑙 − 𝛼) 𝛽𝑛! + 𝛾 1− 𝑛 ! − 𝛼𝜂 > 0   (10) 
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Such a stationary state is always a source (i.e., it is repulsive). If condition (10) does not hold, then 
no stationary state exists in the interior of S. 
2) A unique stationary state always exists in the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! (not coinciding with either 𝑒! or 𝑒!) 
of the simplex S (see Figure 1); it is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in 𝑒! − 𝑒!) if the 
stationary state in the interior of S exists (see point one of this proposition); otherwise it is a source. 
3) A unique stationary state exists in the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! if 𝑑 < 0 (see condition (5)) and it is always a 
saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in 𝑒! − 𝑒!). If 𝑑 ≥ 0, then no stationary state exists 
in 𝑒! − 𝑒!. 
4) A unique stationary state exists in the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! if 𝑒 − 𝑏 < 0 (see condition (6)), and it is 
always a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in 𝑒! − 𝑒!). If 𝑒 − 𝑏 ≥ 0, then no stationary 
state exists in 𝑒! − 𝑒!. 
 
Proof: See the Mathematical Appendix A. 
 
5. Classification of Dynamic Regimes 
Bomze (1983) provided a complete classification of two-dimensional replicator equations. The 
above propositions allow us to select, among all of the phase portraits illustrated in Bomze’s paper, 
those that can be observed under dynamics (2). In Figures 2-8, sinks (i.e., attractive stationary 
states) are indicated by full dots, sources (i.e., repulsive stationary states) are indicated by open dots 
and saddle points by drawings of their stable and unstable branches. The basins of attraction of 𝑒!, 𝑒!, and 𝑒! are rendered in yellow, blue and pink, respectively. According to Proposition 3 (and to 
Bomze's classification), every trajectory starting from an initial distribution of strategies 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥! 0 , and 𝑥! 0 —neither belonging to a one-dimensional stable manifold of a saddle point 
nor coinciding with a stationary state in which more than one strategy is adopted—approaches one 
of the pure population stationary states 𝑒!, 𝑒!, and 𝑒!. In the following subsections, we will present 
the complete classification of the possible dynamics regimes that can be observed under (2). 
 
5.1. Regime One: Conditions (5) and (6) Hold 
In this context, all of the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) , 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) , and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1)  are 
simultaneously attractive and the regimes illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 can be observed. The former 
—corresponding to the phase portrait number 35 (PP#35) in Bomze’s (1983) classification—occurs 
when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist; see condition 
(10)), while the latter—corresponding to PP#7—occurs when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 > 0. 
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In this context, the stationary state 𝑒! = 0,0,1  —in which all the individuals play the NP 
strategy—is Pareto dominated by the other locally attracting stationary states. This suggests that the 
NP strategy can be interpreted as an adaptive behavior that agents may want to play to protect 
themselves from situations of relational poverty and decay of the surrounding social environment. 
As clearly illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, these regimes are strongly path dependent. If the initial 
distribution of the different forms of participation is close enough to 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0), i.e., if 𝑥! 0  is 
high enough and  𝑥! 0  and 𝑥!(0) are low enough, then the economy converges to 𝑒!, and all 
individuals adopt the SN strategy. On the other hand, if the initial distribution is close enough to 𝑒! 
or 𝑒!, then the economy converges to 𝑒! or 𝑒!. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic regime in which all of the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0), 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0), and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are 
simultaneously attractive and a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction 
of 𝑒!, 𝑒! and 𝑒! are rendered in yellow, blue and pink, respectively. 
 
 
 
	 17 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic regime in which all of the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0), 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0), and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are 
simultaneously attractive and a stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of 𝑒!, 𝑒! 
and 𝑒! are rendered in yellow, blue and pink, respectively. 
 
 
5.2. Regime Two: Condition (5) Holds, But (6) Does Not Hold 
In this context, the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, while 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) is a 
saddle point. The regimes are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  
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Figure 4. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, and 
a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction of 𝑒!and 𝑒! are rendered in 
yellow and pink, respectively. 
 
 
The regime in Figure 4—corresponding to PP#37 of Bomze’s classification—occurs when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist; see condition (10)), 
while the latter—corresponding to PP#9—occurs when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 > 0. In this context, the stationary 
state 𝑒! = 0, 0, 1  in which all the individuals play the NP strategy is Pareto dominated by state 𝑒! = 1, 0, 0  in which all the individuals play the SN strategy. Furthermore, the stationary state 𝑒! = 0, 1, 0  in which all the individuals play the NS strategy is Pareto dominated by both the 
stationary states 𝑒! = 1, 0, 0  and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1). 
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Figure 5. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, and 
a stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of 𝑒! and 𝑒! are rendered in yellow 
and pink, respectively. 
 
 
5.3. Regime Three: Condition (6) Holds, But (5) Does Not Hold 
In this context, the vertices 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, while 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) is a 
saddle point. The regimes are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. The regime in Figure 6—corresponding 
to PP#37 of Bomze’s classification—occurs when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 ≤ 0 (i.e., when a stationary state in the 
interior of S does not exists (see condition (10)), while the latter—corresponding to PP#9—occurs 
when 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 > 0. In this context, the stationary state 𝑒! = 0, 0, 1  in which all the individuals 
play the NP strategy is Pareto dominated by state 𝑒! = 0, 1, 0  in which all the individuals play the 
NS strategy. Furthermore, the stationary state 𝑒! = 1, 0, 0  in which all the individuals play the SN 
strategy is Pareto dominated by both the stationary states 𝑒! = 0, 1, 0  and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1). 
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Figure 6. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, and 
a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist. The basins of attraction of 𝑒!and 𝑒! are rendered in 
blue and pink, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 7. Dynamic regime in which only the vertices 𝑒! = (0, 1, 0) and 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) are attractive, and 
a stationary state in the interior of S exists. The basins of attraction of 𝑒! and 𝑒! are rendered in blue and 
pink, respectively. 
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5.4. Regime Four: Neither Condition (5) Nor (6) Hold 
In this context, 𝑎𝑒 − 𝑏𝑑 ≤ 0 always holds (i.e., a stationary state in the interior of S does not exist), 
and the unique dynamic regime that can be observed is illustrated in Figure 8, corresponding to 
PP#42 of Bomze’s classification. In this regime, the unique attractive stationary state is 𝑒! =(0, 0, 1), in which all individuals withdraw from social participation, which Pareto dominates both 
the stationary states 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0) and 𝑒 ! = (0, 1, 0). 
This extreme scenario may be interpreted as the result of exogenous conditions of social decay, 
which make social participation (in any form) poorly rewarding. For instance, the scarcity of 
infrastructures for face-to-face interactions (e.g., meeting places such as public parks, theaters, 
clubs, associations) lowers the reward provided by the NS strategy. Furthermore, the poverty of 
technological infrastructures for fast Internet access lowers the reward associated with the SN 
strategy. 
 
 
Figure 8. Dynamic regime in which only the vertex 𝑒! = (0, 0, 1) is attractive. Its basin of attraction is in 
pink. 
 
 
6. Discrimination and the Social Poverty Trap 
The classification of dynamic regimes illustrated in Figures 2-8 suggests that the structure of the 
basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 crucially depends on the propensity for 
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discrimination of the two sub-populations of socially active individuals. The higher the propensity 
for discrimination, the greater the probability that individuals will ultimately segregate themselves, 
making society fall into the trap.  
In fact, the less gratifying the interaction between SN and NS players, the more attractive the social 
isolation strategy NP becomes. If the rewards δ and ε that SN and NS players get when they interact 
face-to-face is particularly low, then they both might be tempted to withdraw from social interaction, 
whatever the initial share of the sub-population adopting either SN or NS is. Notice that when 
condition (10) holds, then a stationary state in the interior of the simplex S exists. This condition is 
never satisfied if the rewards δ and ε are negative and low enough. In such a context, if the 
stationary states e1 and e2 are attractive (see the regime shown in Figure 2), then the basin of 
attraction of the social poverty trap e3 is so large that it includes points close to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!, 
where the NP strategy is almost extinct, the majority of the population socially participates and the 
two strategies of social participation (NS and SN) are uniformly distributed. 
However, the basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 does not include the areas in close 
proximity to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! if the rewards δ and ε are high enough and, therefore, condition (10) 
is satisfied (see Figure 3). This result suggests that, if the two sub-populations of SN and NS players 
have a limited tendency to discriminate against each other—which happens if the rewards δ and ε 
that the two types of players receive when they interact face-to-face are high enough—then society 
will be less likely to fall into the social poverty trap in the cases in which the initial level of social 
participation is high, even if the two strategies NS and SN are uniformly distributed, as happens in 
the dynamic regime illustrated in Figure 3. On the other hand, when the reward given by the 
interaction between SN and NS players is particularly low, the two strategies ultimately may crowd 
each other out. A similar crowding-out effect also applies to the dynamic regimes illustrated in 
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. In these cases, the basin of attraction of the social poverty trap e3 is so large 
that it also includes the areas in close proximity to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒!. This means that society can 
converge to e3 even if the initial share of the sub-population adopting the social participation 
strategies SN and NS is particularly high.  
 
7. Supplementary Result: A Prediction of the Model 
There is growing empirical evidence showing that face-to-face interaction is associated with higher 
levels of well-being than SNS-mediated interactions. Using Italian cross-sectional data, Sabatini 
and Sarracino (2017) found that subjective well-being is positively correlated with face-to-face 
encounters and negatively correlated with SNS-mediated interactions. Helliwell and Huang (2013) 
reached a similar conclusion by comparing the well-being effects of online and offline friendships 
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in a Canadian sample. Kross et al. (2013) examined this issue using experience sampling. The 
authors text-messaged people five times per day for two weeks to test how offline and Facebook-
mediated interactions correlate with aspects of subjective well-being (SWB). Results indicate that 
Facebook use predicts negative shifts in SWB, while face-to-face interactions show no significant 
effect. Based on a survey conducted on a representative sample of 2,000 French Facebook users, 
Pénard and Mayol (2015) found that Facebook interferes with subjective well-being through its 
effects on friendships and self-esteem. Their results show that people who also use the network to 
seek social approval in the form of more “likes” tend to be more unsatisfied with their life. 
Similarly, Sabatini and Sarracino (2016) drew on Italian representative data to show that the use of 
SNS is associated with lower levels of satisfaction with respondents’ income, which was not found 
to be the case from face-to-face interactions, thereby suggesting that the use of online networks can 
raise material aspirations with detrimental effects for SWB. 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests the utility of further analyzing the dynamics occurring in 
the region of the simplex where: 
 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥! > 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥!  
 
In this region, the reward provided by a strategy of social participation exclusively based on face-
to-face interactions is higher than the benefits associated with the use of SNS (the SN strategy). The 
following proposition allows for the prediction of the possible evolution of the shares of the 
population 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! adopting the three strategies in a society, starting from an initial configuration 
of payoffs that are consistent with the evidence mentioned above, where: 
 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥!(0) > 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥!(0)  
 
 
Proposition 4 
The set in which 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥! > 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥!  
 
holds (where the payoff of strategy SN is lower than that of strategy NS) and the set in which 
 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥! < 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥!  
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holds (where the payoff of strategy SN is higher than that of strategy NS) are invariant under 
dynamics (2). That is, every trajectory starting from the former cannot enter the latter, and vice 
versa. 
 
Proof: See the Mathematical Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 4 states that if the payoff associated with the NS strategy is initially higher than that 
associated with the SN strategy, then it will always be higher than that provided by the SN strategy, 
unless exogenous perturbations change the model’s parameters. As a result, the economy cannot 
converge to the stationary state 𝑒! = 1, 0, 0 , in which all individuals adopt the SN strategy, if it is 
starting from the region in which 𝐸𝑃!" > 𝐸𝑃!" holds. This means that almost all of the trajectories 
starting from such a region will converge to e2, in which individuals socially participate by 
exclusive means of face-to-face interactions, or to e3, in which nobody participates. Only one 
trajectory can reach the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! where the NS and the NP strategies coexist. In any case, the 
analysis of dynamics suggests that society will converge to equilibria in which no one adopts the SN 
strategy. 
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we developed an evolutionary game model to study the dynamics of different modes 
of interaction in contexts characterized by the steep rise in the use of SNS and a supposed decline in 
face-to-face social participation. In our framework, individuals can choose to withdraw from social 
relations or to interact with others online and offline. The analysis showed that, depending on the 
configuration of payoffs and the initial distribution of the various modes of participation in the 
population, different Nash equilibria could be reached. If we allow a configuration of payoffs that is 
compatible with individuals’ preference for similar others, then discrimination will lead to the 
segregation of the three sub-populations accounted for in the analysis and, ultimately, to the 
survival of only one of the three. Every trajectory that starts from an initial distribution of strategies 
neither belonging to a one-dimensional stable manifold of a saddle point nor coinciding with a 
stationary state in which more than one strategy is adopted will approach one of the homogenous 
population stationary states. 
If the reward for social withdrawal is low enough, then the stationary states in which all individuals 
play one of the two strategies of participation, e1 and e2, are locally attractive. In this case, they both 
Pareto dominate the stationary state in which everyone withdraws from social interaction, e3. 
However, there is no Pareto dominance relationship between e1 and e2. 
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If e1 and e2 are attractive, then the former can Pareto dominate the latter or vice versa, but in both 
cases the equilibria Pareto dominate the social poverty trap e3. The dynamic regimes are strongly 
path dependent. If the initial distribution of the three strategies is close enough to e1, then the 
economy will converge to e1. The same can be said for e2 and e3. The social poverty trap e3, on the 
other hand, is always a sink, whatever the payoff of social withdrawal. In this scenario, the 
withdrawal from social participation can be interpreted as a defensive behavior in the sense 
theorized by Hirsch (1976). Individuals, in fact, might want to cope with the deterioration in the 
social environment surrounding them and/or with the increasing busyness related to their material 
aspirations by choosing to limit their social relationships to a minimum. This result is related to 
previous research that studied how growth may cause negative externalities on social relationships 
and social cohesion (Putnam, 2000; Antoci et al., 2012; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). These 
studies claimed that the rise in material aspirations and the need to work more might tighten time 
constraints, causing deterioration in the social environment and prompting a gradual withdrawal 
from face-to-face interactions. 
Social withdrawal is self-reinforcing, in that the higher the share of the population renouncing 
social participation, the poorer the social environment becomes, for example, in terms of social 
engagement opportunities. People playing the NP strategy will ultimately decide to segregate 
themselves from the rest of the population.  
In all of the possible cases corresponding to the stationary states e1, e2 and e3, the segregation 
entailed by individuals’ tendency for discrimination will lead to the survival of only one of the 
initial sub-populations.  
The model also allowed us to study the future of social participation in a world in which social 
interaction via online networks is less rewarding than offline interaction. This scenario is 
particularly interesting as it is consistent with findings from the most recent empirical studies 
comparing the effect of face-to-face and SNS-mediated interactions on individuals’ well-being. Our 
results suggest that dynamics starting from this scenario will lead the SN strategy to extinction, 
which entails that Facebook and similar platforms will disappear.  
If we interpret the NS strategy more flexibly (and perhaps realistically) as a means of social 
participation demanding a minimum, instead of a null, interaction via SNS (e.g., NS agents may 
have formally subscribed to SNS, but they actually do not often use them), then the possible 
equilibria—existing in e2, e3 or in the edge between them—entail at least a dramatic reduction in the 
use of Facebook and other platforms, instead of their definitive disappearance. 
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Mathematical Appendix A 
Dynamics (2) is equivalent (see Hofbauer, 1981) to the Lotka-Volterra system: 
 𝑋 = 𝑋 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋       (11) 𝑌 = 𝑌 𝑑 + 𝑒𝑋 + 𝑓𝑌       (12)  
 
via the coordinate change: 
 𝑥! = !!!!!! , 𝑥! = !!!!!! , 𝑥! = !!!!!!    (13) 
 
From which 𝑋 = 𝑥2 𝑥1 and 𝑌 = 𝑥3 𝑥1. 
Please note that by the coordinate change (13), the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! of the simplex S (see Figure 1) 
corresponds to the positive semi-axis 𝑌 = 0 of the plane (X,Y), the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! corresponds to the 
positive semi-axis 𝑋 = 0 and the vertex 𝑒! corresponds to the point (X,Y) = (0,0) (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Arrow diagram of the Lotka-Volterra system. The edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! of the simplex S corresponds to 
the positive semi-axis 𝑌 = 0 of the plane (X,Y), the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! corresponds to the positive semi-axis 𝑋 = 0, and the vertex 𝑒! corresponds to the point (X,Y)=(0,0). The set in which 𝐸𝑃!" > 𝐸𝑃!" holds 
coincides with the region on the left of the vertical straight line 𝑋 = −𝑎/𝑏. 
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According to equation (11), 𝑋 = 0 holds along the axis 𝑋 = 0 and along the vertical straight 
line 𝑋 = −𝑎 𝑏>0; furthermore, 𝑋 > 0  (𝑋 < 0) holds on the right (respectively, on the left) of 𝑋 = −𝑎 𝑏. According to equation (12), 𝑌 = 0 holds along the axis 𝑌 = 0 and along the straight 
line 𝑌 = −𝑑 𝑓 − 𝑒 𝑓 𝑋 . Furthermore,  𝑌 > 0 ( 𝑌 < 0 ) holds above (respectively, below) 𝑌 = −𝑑 𝑓 − 𝑒 𝑓 𝑋. 
Remembering that 𝑎 < 0, 𝑏 > 0, and 𝑓 > 0, we have that a unique stationary state with X>0 and 
Y>0, 𝑋,𝑌 = −𝑎/𝑏,−𝑑/𝑓 + 𝑎𝑒 / 𝑏𝑓 , exists if and only if  𝑎𝑒 > 𝑏𝑑  (condition (10) of 
Proposition 3). The Jacobian matrix of system (11)-(12), evaluated at 𝑋,𝑌 , is a triangular matrix: 
 𝐽 𝑋,𝑌 = 𝑏𝑋 0𝑌 𝑓𝑌  
 
With eigenvalues  𝑏𝑋 > 0 (in direction of = −𝑎 𝑏 ) and 𝑓𝑌 > 0. So 𝑋,𝑌  is always a repulsive 
node (this completes the proof of point one of Proposition 3). 
By following similar steps, it is easy to verify that: 
1) The Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12) always admits a unique stationary state 𝑋,𝑌 = (−𝑎 𝑏, 0), 
with −𝑎/𝑏 > 0, belonging to the positive semi-axis 𝑌 = 0 (corresponding to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! of 
the simplex S; see Figure 1). Such a stationary state is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying 
in 𝑌 = 0, and stable manifold lying in 𝑋 = −𝑎 𝑏) if the internal stationary state 𝑋,𝑌  exists; 
otherwise it is a source (point two of Proposition 3). 
2) The Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12) admits a unique stationary state 𝑋,𝑌 = (0,−𝑑 𝑓), with −𝑑 𝑓 > 0, belonging to the positive semi-axis 𝑋 = 0 (corresponding to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! of the 
simplex S) if 𝑑 < 0. Such a stationary state is always a saddle point with unstable manifold lying in 𝑋 = 0. If 𝑑 ≥ 0, then no stationary state with 𝑌 > 0 exists in the positive semi-axis 𝑋 = 0 (point 
three of Proposition 3). 
3) The state 𝑋,𝑌 = (0,0) (corresponding to the vertex 𝑒! of the simplex S; see Figure 1) is always 
a stationary state; it is a saddle point (with unstable manifold lying in 𝑋 = 0, and stable manifold 
lying in 𝑌 = 0) if 𝑑 ≥ 0 (i.e., if the stationary state in the semi-axis 𝑋 = 0 does not exist, see point 
two above), otherwise it is a sink (point one of Proposition 1). 
The stability properties of the stationary states 𝑒! and 𝑒! (points two to three of Proposition 1) and 
the existence and stability properties of the stationary state belonging to the edge 𝑒! − 𝑒! (point 
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four of Proposition 3)8 can be easily analyzed by applying Propositions 1, 2 and 5 in Bomze (1983), 
who provided a complete classification of two-dimensional replicator equations. 
 
Mathematical Appendix B 
The condition: 
 𝐸𝑃!" 𝑥!, 𝑥! > 𝐸𝑃!"(𝑥!, 𝑥!) 
 
can be written as follows: 
 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! < 0, 𝑏𝑥! < −𝑎𝑥!, 𝑋 < − !!, 
 
where 𝑋 = 𝑥2 𝑥1. Consequently, in the positive quadrant of the plane (𝑋,𝑌), the set in which 𝐸𝑃!" > 𝐸𝑃!" holds coincides with the region on the left of the vertical straight line (see Figure 9): 
 𝑋 = − !!>0      (14) 
 
Along the straight line (14), 𝑋 = 0 holds, while the set in which 𝐸𝑃!" < 𝐸𝑃!" holds corresponds to 
the region on the right of (14). Since (14) cannot be crossed by trajectories (see Figure 9), the two 
regions separated by (14) are invariant. Consequently, every trajectory starting from the region in 
which 𝐸𝑃!" < 𝐸𝑃!" cannot converge to the stationary state 𝑋,𝑌 = (0,0), which corresponds to 
the stationary state 𝑒! = (1, 0, 0). This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
																																																								
8 Such stationary states do not correspond to stationary states of the Lotka-Volterra system (11)-(12).	
